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On Γίγνων: 
Διἀνοια και Ἀγάλματα as seen in Birth and Line Metaphors 
 “…γένοι, ὸιος ἐστί μαθών.”1 The seventy-second line in Pindar’s second Pythian Ode, 
the enigmatic “Become as you are, having learned such a thing.” There exists about the 
enigmatic statement a certain sense of “self-birth” that is necessary for one to undergo. This short 
line from Pindar is not the only instance of becoming in the Greek world; a similar line was 
inscribed as one of the Delphic imperatives, “know thyself”.  
 It is no surprise, then, to see that the Platonic dialogues are also instantiated with the idea 
of “becoming”, γίγνομαι in the Greek. Just as γίγνομαι was a verb with a variety of meanings, so 
too is the idea of “becoming” in the Platonic dialogues. This idea of becoming ranges from the 
theory of recollection, as described most specifically in the Meno, to the use of birth metaphors 
as found in the Theaetetus and the Phaedrus.  
 In his book, Blindness and Reorientation, philosopher C.D.C Reeve introduced another 
dialogue which makes use of the birth metaphor, the Symposium. And although this is in no way 
unusual or unexpected, the language of the birth metaphor differs sharply from that found in the 
Theaetetus, with few of the same words being used in birth metaphor as in the other. Indeed, the 
birth metaphors of the Theaetetus and the Symposium, as Reeve found it, are so different, they 
appear to be metaphors for two different kinds of birth. This idea of difference is supported in the 
fact that the “offspring” in the two dialogues is represented by two completely different words: 
in the Symposium, it is ἀγάλματα2, whereas in the Theaetetus, it is διάνοια.  
 This paper will examine C.D.C Reeve’s use of ἀγάλματα as a birth metaphor in the 
dialogue the Symposium, and compare it to the other birth metaphors as found in the Theaetetus. 
This paper posits that there is a difference betwixt the ἀγάλματα found in Socrates and the 
                                                     
1 Loeb, 238  
2 C.D.C Reeve, Blindness and Reorientation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 21. 
διάνοια with which certain men are found to be pregnant3. The relationship of ἀγάλματα and 
διάνοια are commensurate to the relationship of διάνοια and νοήσις as found in the hierarchy of 
understanding in the soul in the line metaphor of the Republic.  
 The paper will seek to prove this thesis by means of close philological and philosophical 
examination of the selection and use of words chosen in birth metaphors in the dialogues of first 
the Theaetetus, then in the Symposium.4 Having established the difference and connection of the 
birth metaphors in the prior dialogues, the paper will then move into a comparison of the birth 
metaphors to the line metaphor in the Republic.   
The Theaetetus, Ἤ Διάνοια  
 Let us begin with an examination of the Theaetetus, the dialogue in which the birth 
metaphor is most obvious. It is in this dialogue that Socrates openly aligns himself with the 
midwife, stating not only that he is the son of the “noble and burly” midwife Phaenarete5, but 
also that he himself practices the art of midwifery. “Now my art of midwifery is just like theirs in 
most respects. The difference is that I attend men and not women, and that I watch over the labor 
of their souls, not of their bodies.”6   
 This is the most open of the metaphors, a mere surface analogy for the understanding of 
Theaetetus. The metaphor deepens as Socrates continues to state, “the most important thing 
about my art is the ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the 
young mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth.”7 This is Levett’s 
                                                     
3 As is described as offspring in the Theaetetus.  
4 Although other dialogues will be mentioned to further elucidate a point, these will be the three main dialogues 
used.  
5 Theaetetus 149a1-2 
6 Theaetetus 150b7-c1 
7 Levett’s Theaetetus 150c1-c4 
translation, but Fowler’s translation of the passage describes that which is brought forth either as 
a phantom, or as “a real and genuine offspring.”8  
 Upon examining the Greek, one finds that the word which both Levett and Fowler 
translate as “real offspring” is in fact not the Greek for offspring at all. At no time in the dialogue 
is the word παῖς used, the common word for “child” in Greek. At select times in the dialogue9 is 
ἔκγονος used, an adjective taking the genitive which means “born of, sprung from”, or used 
substantively as a noun meaning “child”. 
  The word chosen by Plato, instead, to describe the “genuine offspring” or the “real truth” 
is the word διάνοια. This word in fact has no connotation of child or birth at all in the Greek 
lexicon; Liddle and Scott define διάνοια as a “thought, a purpose, an intelligence, an 
understanding”.  And yet one cannot fault either translator; the metaphor of the midwife and the 
very verbiage of the sentence—the verb is ἀποτίκτω, to bring forth, to bring forth into the 
world—ensure that the connotation of διάνοια is that of “offspring”.  
 Through this examination, it becomes clear that that to which men give birth is ἥ διάνοια 
ἤ γόνιμόν τε καί ἀληθές—an offspring which is both true and genuine. This διάνοια is something 
ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς, that is, born from the soul. That which Socrates delivers of pregnant men is 
therefore some sort of understanding or intelligence that is born directly from the soul, as 
opposed to that which is εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος, a “phantom” and “false”. The grammar of the 
sentence opposes the two nouns, the understanding and the phantom, and their following 
descriptors, real and false respectively. Through this language, it was manifest that this is a birth 
metaphor for διάνοια in the Platonic dialogues. It is not the body of the man who is pregnant so 
much as it is his soul; but as the soul is encapsulated in the body, physical words of birth must be 
                                                     
8 Fowler’s Theaetetus 150c1-c4 
9 For example, Theaetetus d1-d2 
used to describe the birth of ideas—of διάνοια—in the soul. This διάνοια, being both real and 
true, is therefore linked to knowledge.  
Reeve’s Symposium, Τ’ Ἀγάλματα  
  In chapter two of Blindness and Reorientation, philosopher C.D.C Reeve introduces 
another birth metaphor, the likes of which previously not seen in previous readings of the 
Symposium: the use of the word ἀγάλματα. He does not pay attention to the very clear birth 
metaphor given by Socrates in the Symposium10, but rather suggests that ἀγάλματα is a birth 
metaphor for Socrates himself. 
 The word is first used when Alcibiades enters the feast in the Symposium, upon which 
entrance he declares “ Socrates is most like those silenuses sitting in the statuary shops, the ones 
the craftsmen manufacture, with pipes and flutes, but when opened in the middle, they turn out to 
have ἀγάλματα of the gods inside them” (215a7-b3).11 
 The simile is rather an odd one, as there is no clear idea about the nature of a “silenus”, as 
there are no longer any ones extant.12 What is clear enough to conclude, however, is that “as a 
silenus contained statues of the gods, so Socrates, too, contained things relevantly similar to 
them.”13 
Having discussed the somewhat puzzling nature of the silenus, Reeve explores the use of 
the word ἀγάλματα, first giving the standard definition, “typically a figurative statue in honor of 
a god or—and more often in Plato—a figurative statue of any sort: the puppets that cast their 
shadows on the walls of the cave are ἀγάλματα (R.7, 517d7).14   
                                                     
10 Symposium 209a-e5 
11 Reeve, 20 
12 Reeve, 20 
13 Reeve, 20 
14 Reeve, 20. 
Reeve returns to an analysis of the Symposium text, and it is revealed that these ἀγάλματα 
found in Socrates are “ἀγάλματα of virtue, and that they have the greatest reach—or rather, that 
they extend to everything that is appropriate for a man who intends to be fine and good to 
consider.” (221e1-222a6)15  
From this conclusion, that ἀγάλματα are “ἀγάλματα of virtue”16, he draws another: that 
the ἀγάλματα are themselves to be seen as embryo-like entities”.17 He draws this conclusion 
from the verb choice of Alcibiades to describe Socrates, that he “teems” (216d7), the translation 
of γέμω. Γέμω is a verb which typically means “to be full” or “to be filled with”18, and Reeve 
links this meaning to the verb κύω, the verb “to conceive” or “to be pregnant with”. 
From this series of word choices and definitions, Reeve concludes that it is a portrayal of 
Socrates “as a male pregnant with embryonic virtue”19. He solidifies this idea first by aligning it 
with “deep roots in Greek thinking about sexual reproduction”, that the “female serves only as an 
incubator from an embryo produced exclusively by a male”.20  He also aligns this idea of male 
reproduction with Diotima, “when she portrays reproduction as involving pregnant males 
seeking females in whom to beget”.21 
 There is a twofold problem, however, which arises out of Reeve’s connotative translation 
and understanding of ἀγάλματα as a birth metaphor, and Socrates as a “pregnant male figure” in 
the Symposium. The first of these two problems centers on the Theaetetus. Reeve focuses on the 
Phaedrus and the Alcibiades, as well as the Symposium, to illustrate the idea that ἀγάλματα is 
“embryonic virtue” with which Socrates is pregnant. There is no mention of the Theaetetus, and 
                                                     
15 Reeve, 21 
16 Reeve, 22 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid; Reeve cites this as being said by Apollo in a work by Aeschylus. 
21 Reeve, 23. 
if this is indeed a metaphor, as Reeve suggests, there is little explanation as to why there is no 
mention of the Theaetetus in his discussion. This is remarkably odd, in that the Theaetetus is the 
dialogue in which there is heavy use of the birth metaphor, as discussed above.  
Moreover, Socrates states openly in the Theaetetus that midwives are those who have had 
children, as “human nature is too weak to acquire skill where it has no experience.”22 At the 
same time, those who are midwives must be “past child-bearing” as “women never practice as 
midwives while they are still conceiving and bearing children themselves.”23 By aligning himself 
with the midwife and declaring his difference from them to be those whom he practices upon—
men—and of what he delivers them—either phantoms or διάνοια—it is clear that Socrates at one 
time gave birth to his own διάνοια, but is past that “child-bearing” age, as he now acts as a 
midwife for other pregnant men.  
This fact appears to go directly against the suggestion of Reeve that Socrates is a figure 
of a “male pregnant with embryonic virtue”, if his understanding of ἀγάλματα is correct. In fact, 
the Theaetetus makes quite the opposite point—that Socrates, while perhaps pregnant once, is no 
longer so. This troubles the Reeve understanding of ἀγάλματα quite seriously, for how could 
Socrates be pregnant with “embryonic virtue” while it is quite clearly stated that he can no longer 
give birth? If Reeve’s understanding of ἀγάλματα is correct, it would seem that either it or 
Socrates is impotent—both of which solutions seem ludicrous. How could “embryonic virtue” be 
impotent; how could the “wisest man” as proclaimed by the Delphic oracle, be impotent? 
Furthermore, ἀγάλματα is never found in the Theaetetus; Plato uses διάνοια as the ἔκγονος of 
men’s souls.  
                                                     
22 Theaetetus 149c2-c4 
23 Theaetetus 149 b6-8 
There is a further—and perhaps more troubling—difficulty to Reeve’s understanding of 
ἀγάλματα as “embryonic virtue” in a pregnant Socrates. The word “ἀγάλματα” means “a statue 
in honor of a god”, with the specific meaning in Plato of “any figurative statue”.24 Reeve kept 
that sense of the word in his choice translation of “embryo” which he states as “genuinely similar 
to figurative statues”.25 What Reeve does not resolve so readily or persuasively is the use of the 
exact same word, ἀγάλματα, in the Republic’s metaphor of the cave.26 Although he does indeed 
mention the usage, he resolves this simply it is this meaning of the word which “Alcibiades 
initially seems to have in mind”.  
Reeve continues on to clarify the meaning of ἀγάλματα, but without exact or final 
resolution of this problem. It has been proved in the Theaetetus that Plato chooses his words with 
and for a definitive cause. Ergo, it throws into doubt that Plato could use at the same time 
ἀγάλματα to mean both “puppets” and “shadows” in the Republic and “embryonic virtue” as a 
birth metaphor in the Symposium. It is hard to believe that Socrates could be aligned with the 
things which cast shadows, as he is both a midwife of souls27 and the “kind of gadfly” on the 
“great and noble horse”28 of Athens, and of whom the Delphic oracle said “that no one was 
wiser.”29 
And yet although a close reading of the Theaetetus in light of Reeve’s suggestion of 
ἀγάλματα produces conflict, a closer reading reveals resolution, both for the problems found in 
the text of the Theaetetus itself and with the problems in Reeve’s suggestion as discussed above.  
Let us return to the section of the Theaetetus which was so troublesome for both the 
Theaetetus and Reeve’s birth metaphor. In the Theaetetus, Socrates states, “For one thing which 
                                                     
24 The Middle Liddle and Scott 
25 Reeve, 22 
26 Republic 517d-7 
27 The Theaetetus  
28 Apology 30e 
29 Apology 21a7 
I have in common with the ordinary midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom.”30 “The 
God…has forbidden me to procreate…I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery 
worth the name of wisdom.”31 This appears to make it clear that Socrates has never had any 
διάνοια of his own, as the God has forbidden him procreation. And yet at the same time, as 
midwife to those men who are allowed to procreate, Socrates must have at one time given birth 
to such an offspring of understanding. For he also states that the duties of midwifery cannot be 
entrusted to anyone who has not experience what it is like to give birth, as “human nature is too 
weak to acquire skill where it has no experience.”32 
The paper questioned how this could be, as Socrates states two direct contraries within 
thirty lines of each other. The paper also questions how he could have ἀγάλματα, when it is 
nowhere mentioned in the Theaetetus. Perhaps both these questions can be answered in an 
understanding that, while both words belong to birth metaphors, there are two different levels to 
the kind of understanding that comes from the soul.  
On διάνοια and ἀγάλματα  
 The idea that διάνοια and ἀγάλματα are two different instantiations of that which can be 
ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς is a solution, in fact, readily acceptable. For if one accepts that both of these 
things can be born from the soul, the problems in both the Theaetetus and with Reeve’s 
suggested birth metaphor are solved.  
 It is very clear in the Theaetetus that Socrates is no longer able to give birth to διάνοια; 
indeed, that he does not have “any wise invention, the offspring born of [his] own soul.”33 That is 
                                                     
30 Theaetetus 150c4-c5 
31 Theaetetus 150c9-d2 
32 Theaetetus 149c2-c3 
33 Theaetetus 150d1-d2 
it say, he can no longer have any διάνοια; he has not had διάνοια ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς. But he must 
have had some sort of understanding at one point, otherwise he could not act as a midwife.  
 It is at this point the Reeve suggestion of ἀγάλματα is introduced. Before the introduction 
of this suggested birth metaphor as Socrates  pregnant with ἀγάλματα, one reads the Theaetetus 
with ἥ διάνοια as the sole genuine and true thing which can be born of the soul. If Reeve is 
correct and ἀγάλματα can be in be connotatively read as “embryonic virtue”, this is a new 
genuine and true thing which can be born of the soul.  Moreover, ἀγάλματα carry a more 
advanced dimension than διάνοια, as Plato describes these things as “the greatest importance for 
anyone who wants to become a truly good man.”34 There is no such qualitative value given to 
διάνοια, although the understanding born of the soul is most definitely a valuable thing. This 
value is given in the Symposium, where the same birth metaphor language to describe διάνοια is 
used to describe what a man must do in order to commune with Beauty.35 
 When these two dialogues and their respective birth metaphors are read together, it seems 
very likely possible that one must first give birth to διάνοια, and then, once having given birth to 
such an understanding in the soul, one can nurture it as though “he nurtures the newborn”36 to 
this new level of understanding, this “embryonic virtue” that Socrates has within him as though 
her were a silenus, this ἀγάλματα. In short, ἀγάλματα is the advanced stage of διάνοια. Socrates 
has given birth to διάνοια, enabling him to be a midwife to those men with pregnant souls, but he 
can no longer give birth to such offspring because his soul is now nurturing ἀγάλματα.  
 This idea that ἀγάλματα ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς is a more advanced state of διάνοια is 
supported not only in the readings of the Theaetetus and the Symposium, but also in the very 
etymology of the word itself. In the fifth and fourth centuries, there was movement in Greek 
                                                     
3434 Symposium 222a5 
35 Symposium 211c 
36 Symposium 209c8 
culture termed “presentification”, “the making present of the invisible to the imitation of 
appearance.”37 It is in this age that ἀγάλματα came into their own, as it were. One must note the 
dictionary definition of ἀγάλματα, “an honorific statue of a god”. The aim of these statues was to 
“establish a true communication, and authentic contact” with the god they represented.38 The 
ἀγάλματα were much more than simple statues, mimetic representations, but rather they were an 
“attempt to construct a bridge…that will reach toward the divine.”39 It must “participate 
intimately with the divine, and yet by the same move, it must also emphasize what is inaccessible 
and mysterious in divinity, its alien quality, its otherness.”40 Perhaps most importantly, the 
ἀγάλματα had to “stress the incommensurability between the sacred power and everything that 
reveals it to the eyes of mortals in what can only be an inadequate and incomplete way.”41   
 This reading of ἀγάλματα manifests the idea that one’s soul must first undergo the 
conceiving and delivery of διάνοια—which is an understanding born of the soul, integral to the 
journey of philosophers to commune with the forms, as made clear in Diotima’s speech in the 
Symposium. But ἥ διἀνοια is not the last step in the philosopher’s journey to know the forms; 
elsewise Socrates would never have stopped giving birth to his metaphorical offspring. Instead, 
one must nurture the διάνοια into ἀγάλματα, which are bridges to know the forms.  
The Republic: διάνοια and ἀγάλματα as commensurate to the line metaphor  
 The idea that the soul must conceive and bear forth διάνοια, and from that birth of 
understanding the soul might nurture Reeve’s ἀγάλματα, that embryonic virtue which Socrates 
has in his soul, which act as bridges to the forms—this is not an unfamiliar division. This idea of 
a further development of διάνοια is found not only in the birth metaphors of the Theaetetus and 
                                                     
37 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1991), 
152.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
of the Symposium, but also in the Republic. These instantiations of two kind of understanding 
ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς are manifest not in birth metaphors of the Republic—the cave metaphor may 
be taken as a birth metaphor—but most specifically in the metaphor of the line, which Plato 
gives in Book VI.  
 In the line metaphor,42 Socrates distinguishes two realms, the “visible” and the 
“intelligible”.43 The visible section of the line consists of “shadows, then reflections in bodies of 
water and in…shiny materials.”44 The “other subsection of the visible” consists of “the originals 
of these images.”45 The original Greek differentiates these subsections as εἰκασίαν and πίστιν46, 
respectively. The former means “image” or “conjecture”; the latter, “belief”.  
 The next section of the line Socrates classed as the “intelligible”, and he divides it into 
the subsections of διάνοια, and νοήσιν. These subsections are not nearly so easy to explain, as 
they belong to a realm which one can only know, and not see.  
In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is 
compelled to base its inquiry on hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle, but to a 
conclusion. In the other subsection, by contrast, it makes its way to an unhypothetical 
first principle, proceeding from a hypothesis, but without the images used in the previous 
subsection, using the forms themselves and making its methodical inquiry through 
them.47 
 
 The latter subsection of the soul in the intelligible realm is διάνοια; the former is νοήσις. 
Διάνοια is further explained through the practice of geometry, that geometers “use visible forms 
and make their arguments about them, although they are not thinking about them, but about those 
others things that they are like? They make their arguments with a view to the square itself and 
                                                     
42 Beginning Republic Book VI 509d6 
43 Republic 509e7 
44 Republic 510a1-a2 
45 Republic 510a4-a6 
46 Republic 511d8-e1 
47 Republic 510b3-b8 
the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw…”48 The soul who has reached the stage of 
διάνοια is able to “use images in seeking those other things themselves that one cannot see 
except by means of thought.”49  The thoughts which are turned out as result by these image-
assisted inquiries are called “hypotheses”—a genuine and true understanding born of the soul. A 
διάνοια.  
 It is from these hypotheses that one can proceed, insofar as the soul “makes its way to an 
unhypothtical first principle.”50 This νοήσις in the soul “requires no assumption and is the 
starting-point of all….making no use of whatever of any object of sense, but only of pure ideas 
moving on through ideas and ending with ideas.”51 The translation provided by C.D.C Reeve is 
slightly more provocative: “making no use of anything visible at all, but only of forms 
themselves, moving on through forms to forms, and ending in forms.”52 An examination of the 
Greek reveals that what Reeve translates as “form” and Shorey as “idea” is in fact ἔιδος. 
Regardless of the translation choice, what must be grasped from this section of the Republic is 
that it is only through νοήσις that the soul might achieve communion with that which Plato calls 
ἔιδος.  
One cannot ignore the appearance of διάνοια in both the line metaphor and the birth 
metaphors of the Theaetetus and Symposium, especially as Plato is known as a calculating 
wordsmith. It would be possible, perhaps, to explain away the parallelism as a mere coincidence 
if not for the fact that, in both metaphors, διάνοια has the same nature and function. The nature 
of διάνοια in the line metaphor is as an understanding, “something intermediate between opinion 
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and reason.”53 That is, διάνοια falls in between νοήσις and πίστις, between reason and the 
originals of images. In the combined birth metaphors of the Theaetetus and the Symposium— as 
shown by Reeve— διάνοια is the stage above εἴδωλον—a phantom or imposter—and the stage 
prior to νοήσις , a stage in which the soul has within it “embryonic virtue”, ἀγάλματα,  the 
bridges that connect the embodied soul to the realm of the forms. Having ascended to this stage 
in his soul, Socrates cannot descend back into the state of giving birth to διάνοια, and this 
statement is supported by his belief that, when knowing the Good, one cannot do something 
which is not in accordance with it—a phenomenon also known as akrasia. 
 Up to this point, the paper has addressed these two metaphors as separate, as parallel 
lines. But in the prior analysis, it is clear that the line metaphor and its subsections of πίστις, 
διάνοια, and νοήσις conveys the exact same divisions of understanding in the soul as does the 
combined birth metaphor. Διάνοια has the same function in both metaphors. Ἀγάλματα aligns 
with νοήσις in that, when the soul has understanding, it is able to know and connect with—as 
much as an embodied soul is able—the forms. The bridge by which this understanding54 is 
connected to the forms is by the ἀγάλματα which reside in the soul. 
It is not impossible to see that these metaphors are metaphors for the same thing—the 
steps through which one must go to achieve knowledge of and communion with the forms. 
Moreover, the idea that there are many metaphors for one idea—if one will allow the word—is 
an idea frequently found in Plato. To understand this, one must look and the nature and function 
of the metaphor in the Platonic dialogue.  
For Plato, metaphors have a twofold purpose: the first is that a metaphor acts as a noble 
lie for the ὅι πόλλοι, the men who do not have philosophic souls and therefore will never see for 
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themselves the things which the metaphors represent. The metaphor is a noble lie in that there is 
no actual line as given in Book VI of the Republic, but the line does make some aspect of the 
truth which the metaphor represents accessible to those men whose souls are not of philosophic 
bent. In short, there is no line of the intelligible and the visible, but there is a realm of the 
intelligible and the forms.  
 The second purpose of the metaphor is to void the pitfalls of writing which Plato outlines 
in the Phaedrus.55 This purpose of the metaphor is seen in the nature of the birth metaphor. This 
birth metaphor is not a physical metaphor, as is the line analogy, but rather it is a verbal 
metaphor, in that Plato uses words concerning conception and birth to avoid objective writing. 
Objective writing is condemned in Plato because, among other things, it “reach[es] 
indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and it 
doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not.”56 By using such a method as 
the birth metaphor, Plato avoids such a problem. The birth metaphor acts as “a discourse that is 
written down, with knowledge, in the soul of the listener…”57Unlike objective, directive 
writing—which is didactic and simply tells the external mind what is and what it not, the use of 
metaphors in the Platonic dialogues requires one to think, so that the idea conveyed by the 
metaphor is reached—by dialect and by personal thought and inquiry—between mind and mind, 
between soul and soul. This applies not only towards one man to another, but also from one man 
to himself. A metaphor is not only for inducing a reader into the laborious process of conceiving 
διάνοια—so that they might eventually come to a point of νοήσις, where their souls will nourish 
ἀγάλματα of the forms—but also for reminding the philosopher “when he reaches old forgetful 
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56 Phaedrus 275e2-e4 
57 Phaedrus 276a5-a6 
age”; “it is likely he will sow gardens of letters for the sake of amusing himself, storing up 
reminders for himself…”58 Writing must be done in metaphors for this reason, and even then, “at 
their very best, these can only serve as reminders to those who already know.”59 
 The διάνοια which is so essential to the soul cannot be sparked by objective writing, for 
writing is an image, essentially. Just as the geometer no longer looks to drawings of the squares 
but to the square itself, so must the reader of the Platonic dialogue look beyond the literal words 
of the metaphor, and to that which the metaphor represents, which “one cannot see except by 
means of thought.”60 This idea is further supported in the Phaedrus, where Socrates states:     
The dialectician…plants and sows within [the soul] discourse accompanied by 
knowledge—discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who planted  it, which 
is not barren but produces a seed from which more discourse grows…such discourse 
makes the seed forever immortal...61 
 
Perhaps this passage more than any other underwrites the idea that the soul must first conceive 
διάνοια, and then progress in understanding to νοήσις, in which the soul nourishes within it 
ἀγάλματα. The discourse which is not “barren”, as stated above, is that which is διάνοια, while 
that which grows from the διάνοια and makes the seed “forever immortal” are ἀγάλματα. As 
bridges to the forms—which are outside of space and time—it makes perfect sense that that the 
ἀγάλματα too, are immortal, just as is the soul. Moreover, Plato states that “such discourses 
should be called his own legitimate children, first the discourse that he may have discovered 
already within himself and then its sons and brothers…”62 
  The idea that the metaphors of the Platonic dialogues are commensurate to one another is 
not mere conjecture, but a solidly proven thesis. The διάνοια ἔκγονος τῆς ψυχῆς of the 
                                                     
58 Phaedrus 276 d1-d3 
59 Phaedrus 278a1-a2 
60 Republic 510e3-511a1 
61 Phaedrus 276e5-277a3 
62 Phaedrus 278a6-b1 
Theaetetus is commensurate to the fruitful discourse of the Phaedrus—linked by the same 
metaphor of children—which is commensurate to the διάνοια of the Republic’s line metaphor, 
related not only by the very word choice of Plato, but by their same nature and function in the 
soul—as a stepping stone to that state of the soul which nourished ἀγάλματα, which are bridges 
to the forms, which, as Reeve so accurately revealed, is “embryonic virtue” in the soul of 
Socrates.  
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